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Abstract 
Food fortification is a popular strategy for addressing ‘hidden hunger’, and staple foods are seen as 
promising if unproven vehicles for the delivery of essential micronutrients to the poor in developing 
countries. This paper examines wheat flour fortification with iron in Pakistan as a case of 
technocratic optimism in the face of institutional constraints. An evaluative framework based on the 
analysis of the entire value chain can provide a reality check on technocratic optimism. Poor people 
base their preferences for different types of flour on price as well as perceptions of nutritional value. 
Many of these flour types are not covered by fortification programmes. Fortification interventions 
meanwhile have attempted to leverage public-private partnerships in a segment of the wheat flour 
value chain which is beset with regulatory weaknesses.  This paper illustrates why technical 
interventions should support, rather than ignore, a broader agenda of reforms in food policy.  
 
I. Introduction 
Pakistan has high rates of stunting and wasting among children, and high rates of iron deficiency 
among adult women and children alike.  Cereals contribute around half the energy intake in Pakistan 
and wheat dominates all other cereals (Gazdar and Mysorewala 2016). The standard meal includes 
flat wheat flour bread or roti — cooked either on a hot plate as chapati (flat bread) or baked in a clay 
oven as naan (leavened bread ) — as its main starchy component.  Wheat flour has, therefore, been 
seen as a promising vehicle for addressing anaemia through iron fortification (Gaffey et al. 2014). The 
high prevalence of wheat flour consumption, which makes wheat a favourable vehicle for 
fortification, is, in fact, a sign of undernourishment — wheat flour is the cheapest source of energy.  
Even so, around two-fifths of the country’s population consumes less than 2,100 kcal per day 
(Balagamwala and Gazdar 2013). Hunger directly affects around a third of the households. A 
nationally-representative survey found that a tenth of the households had experienced severe hunger 
while another 20 per cent had experienced moderate hunger (National Nutrition Survey 2011). 
 
The appeal of wheat flour fortification, evidence notwithstanding, is clear from the number of 
attempts at establishing fortification programmes (Zuberi et al. 2016).  There have been at least 
seven wheat flour fortification interventions in Pakistan — two national and five regional — since 
2005. Independent evaluations are not publicly available for any of these. The largest programme was 
the National Wheat Flour Fortification Programme (NWFFP) led by the Global Alliance for 
Improved Nutrition (GAIN) with technical support from Nutrition International (NI, formerly 
Micronutrient Initiative).  NI has been involved in one way or other in all interventions since then 
(MI 2015).  The United Nations’ World Food Programme (WFP) is another key participant.  At the 
time when fieldwork for this case study was carried out, the only operational project was a WFP 
and NI one in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) region.  NI is also a technical partner in the 
consortium implementing an ambitious new national fortification programme supported by UKaid 
(DFIDb 2016). 
 
All the interventions follow a similar model. They work with licensed private sector flour mills to 
create capacity for fortification, provide the pre-mix, conduct social marketing campaigns to increase 
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awareness about the benefits of consuming fortified flour, and lobby for the mandatory fortification 
of flour and for the setting up of systems of quality assurance.  These are, in fact, common elements 
in food fortification programmes across developing countries.  This paper proposes to study wheat 
flour fortification programmes as a case study of technocratic optimism in the face of stubborn 
institutional constraints.  This study aims to throw light on wheat flour fortification in Pakistan 
through an agri-food value- chain perspective.  It aims to highlight potential bottlenecks and 
knowledge gaps with respect to producer incentives and consumer behaviour in the delivery of 
nutrient-dense food to those who need it the most.  The study examines wheat flour value chains 
and past food fortification interventions, and draws lessons for the design of fortification 
interventions as well as for broader reforms of food policy. 
 
Existing and planned interventions for wheat flour fortification are implicitly optimistic about the 
achievement of sustainable nutrition improvements through partnerships between public policy and 
private business. A conceptual framework that is attentive to producer incentives and consumer 
behaviour makes explicit some of the conditions and requirements for success.  This study is not an 
evaluation of current or past wheat flour fortification projects in Pakistan.  Rather, it is an attempt at 
drawing lessons from those projects by training an agri-food lens on what are usually seen as 
narrowly-focused nutrition interventions. The case study bears relevance for countries where 
comparable models of intervention have been championed or implemented, and for a broader 
agenda of pro-nutrition food policy reform. 
 
Section 2 sets out the framing of the case study and its methodology. Wheat flour value chains are 
described in Section 3 where issues for the design of wheat flour fortification interventions are also 
anticipated.  Section 4 reports the observations from the fortification project in AJK. Case study 
findings are discussed in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes the paper and draws out broader lessons 
for nutrition interventions. Notes are found at the end of this paper. 
 
2. Framing and Methodology 
2.1 Technocratic optimism 
‘Technocratic optimism’ — or the belief that there are viable technological solutions to structural 
problems — has been identified as a powerful driver of champions of technology-based interventions 
(May et al. 2003).i  An insightful study of the process of the introduction of a new technology into 
health systems speaks of ‘ideation’ as a level in the discourse where “general notions about the 
definition and production of both a new technology and reliable knowledge about it are formed and 
circulated” (ibid.: 701).  The processes and actions analysed by May et al. in the context of health 
systems could easily apply to the role of champions, such as the American Medical Association in the 
1920s and 1930s (Bishai and Nalubola 2002), or The Lancet 2013 Nutrition Series (e.g., Bhutta et al. 
2013), in the current discourse on food fortification.  Positive but inconclusive evidence on the 
reduction in anaemia through food fortification (e.g., Gera et al. 2012; Das et al. 2013) have been 
deemed ‘reliable knowledge’ on which to base strong advocacy for an intervention for which there is 
no specific evidence — via wheat flour fortification in countries like Pakistan.ii 
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Moreover, as public-private partnership models have progressively replaced government or donor-
administered programmes in developing countries (Danton-Hill 1998; Yach et al. 2010),  food 
fortification champions such as GAIN have constructed persuasive narratives that link technocratic 
optimism with corporate power. The linear output-oriented approach of these narratives 
predisposes them towards ignoring broader issues and causes of hunger and malnutrition (Kaan and 
Liese 2010).  A national-level fortification programme, after all, is more complex and involves 
coordinated actions by a range of players, than a tightly administered trial.iii 
2.2 Value-chain perspective  
The resistance to evidence of particular models of wheat flour fortification interventions in Pakistan 
and elsewhere suggests a need for broader evaluative frameworks that can make explicit some of 
the structural, institutional and behavioural constraints which technocratic optimism overlooks.  
Although it emerged initially as a tool for business strategy, the value- chain perspective gained wider 
applicability for an understanding of how private business might contribute to public policy goals 
such as nutrition.iv  A value chain “is described by the series of activities and actors along the supply 
chain, and what and where value is added in the chain for and by these activities and actors” 
(Hawkes and Ruel 2011: 3). First developed to trace the creation of value and its capture along 
international supply chains, the perspective has been used productively in the study of agri-food 
systems.v  This study draws upon the conceptual framework developed by Maestre et al. (2017) to 
aid the design and assessment of sustainable public-private interventions for improving the nutrition 
of vulnerable populations through the consumption of nutrient-dense foods. 
 
The simple framework developed by Maestre et al. (ibid.) is useful for correcting biases such as 
technocratic optimism.  Based on an extensive review of existing literature on agri-food value chains, 
their framework proposes a checklist of requirements which must be met with respect to producer 
incentives, consumer behaviour and coordination, for the success of an intervention: 
 On the consumer side, the intervention must factor in awareness about the nutritional value 
of the food, and needs to ensure that the food is available, acceptable in terms of tastes and 
cultural norms, and affordable, for the target population.   
 For the intervention to be successful, the private sector must respond to incentives and be 
able to capture value along the value chain, and public policy must play an effective role with 
respect to coordination and regulation.   
 
This system-wide view of an intervention is particularly useful for bringing perspectives from 
agriculture and food policy to bear on nutrition interventions which tend to be driven by health 
programming.  Therefore, the Maestre et al. (ibid.) framework has been used here to map elements 
of the wheat flour value chain in Pakistan — including producer incentives, consumer behaviour and 
regulatory governance — to place the generic model of the wheat flour fortification intervention in 
its broader institutional context. The acceptability or affordability of fortified flour, for example, 
needs to be gauged in relation to other comparable products, and the incentives of private sector 
millers to fortify flour need to be compared with their other options. This study probes whether and 
to what extent this intervention fulfills the requirements set out in Maestre et al. (ibid.), technocratic 
expectations notwithstanding. 
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2.3 Methodology 
Three sources have been drawn on to trace the wheat flour value chain in Pakistan:  Existing studies 
and reviews of the wheat sector and fortification projects; a representative sample survey of 
consumers in (wheat growing) rural areas of the Sindh province; qualitative fieldwork including 
interviews with stakeholders with interests along the value chain, including policymakers, project 
implementers, farmers, millers, wholesalers, retailers and consumers.vi  Community-level qualitative 
research was carried out to understand consumer behaviour and preferences, as well as producer 
incentives. In-depth household interviews were conducted to probe factors behind consumer (and 
producer) choices with respect to the acquisition, storage and use of wheat and wheat flour.  
 
Three types of sites were purposively selected.  First, rural communities in a wheat-growing region 
of the Sindh province were visited to understand both the producer-end of the value chain as well as 
consumption patterns in a setting where locally-produced wheat was in abundant supply.  Second, 
low- to middle-income localities in the metropolis of Karachi were selected to gain insights into 
consumer behaviour in a market-dominated setting.  Third, the idea was to observe a wheat flour 
fortification project at work.  The only opportunity at the time of the fieldwork was in Azad Jammu 
and Kashmir which had an ongoing fortification programme.   The aim was to interview informants in 
rural as well as urban areas in that region but it was not possible to visit rural sites due to security 
considerations.   
 
The main respondents in these communities were mothers of young children:  a married woman 
who had a child younger than a year qualified.  These women and other individuals in their 
households, including their husbands, were interviewed about any interaction they had with the 
wheat value chain, as producers and consumers.  Community-level resource persons helped to 
identify initial respondents in each site.  These respondents then suggested other eligible individuals 
for in-depth interviews.  Although all the survey sites were relatively low-income communities, care 
was taken to ensure that the respondents included the more marginalised individuals and households 
as well as the somewhat better-off ones.  
3 Wheat Flour Value Chains 
3.1 Grain to flour 
Pakistan grows around 23 million mt of wheat annually and domestic output is sufficient, in most 
years, to satisfy consumer demand (Ministry of National Food Security and Research 2014-15). In 
the winter (rabi) season, wheat occupies around four-fifths (78 per cent) of the cropped area. 
Wheat is grown across the country, particularly in the irrigated plains of Punjab and Sindh which 
account for around nine-tenths of the total harvest (ibid.). While it is the main food crop 
everywhere, in a number of ‘surplus’ districts in central and southern Punjab and Sindh wheat is also 
an important cash crop (Dorosh and Salam 2008). 
 
Pakistan’s farm economy is almost entirely made up of private farmers, and there are four main 
channels to which the wheat crop is directed (ibid.).  First, farmers retain part of the crop for self-
consumption and for seed.  Second, there are in-kind payments to various stakeholders, including 
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harvest labourers.  Third, grain is sold at controlled prices to government agencies.vii  Fourth, part of 
the harvest is sold to private buyers — mostly grain traders and flour millers.   
 
In the last ten years, government procurement accounted for around a quarter of total output.  The 
procurement price is meant as an incentive for the bigger commercial farmers to sow wheat and to 
ensure grain availability in the country.  The price is often set at a level that anticipates world market 
prices in order to prevent hoarding and illegal cross-border smuggling (Balagamwala and Gazdar 
2013).viii  But most farmers are smallholders like Ahmed in a village in rural Sindh: 
 
"We harvest around 35-40 maunds (40 kg) of wheat from an acre of land, depending on land quality and 
irrigation.  We retain half the harvest for our own use and the rest of it we sell to private dealers in the city.  
The government rate is 3,250 rupees per 100 kg but you need to have good connections with officials to sell 
to the government.  They don’t buy from us. We sold our wheat soon after the harvest to private traders at a 
much lower rate of 2,700 rupees per 100 kg.   The price goes up later in the year.” (Ahmed, age 30, 
Naushero Feroze district). 
 
The government occupies a strategic position in a sector otherwise dominated by the private sector. 
At harvest time, its procurement agencies — notably provincial food departments — purchase 
around a quarter of the crop at an officially-designated support price. Government stock is 
subsequently sold to private mills at subsidised prices.  The government’s involvement in the wheat 
economy is seen as the main plank of the country’s food security policy, which revolves around 
ensuring domestic stocks of wheat and preventing shortages and price spirals in urban markets 
(Gazdar 2015). 
 
There are no precise data about other uses of the crop but it is estimated that private traders and 
mills directly buy between 15 and 19 per cent of the harvest.  Farmers are, therefore, thought to 
retain over 60 per cent of the harvest in the first instance. Only around half that amount is kept for 
self-consumption or seed.  The rest is either used as in-kind payments (including to harvest 
labourers), or sold to private sector buyers.ix 
3.1.1 Alternative value chains: chakkis and mills 
There are two alternate value chains for producing wheat flour: small-scale, traditional, community-
level chakkis and large-scale flour mills spread across the country.  Virtually all the grain which does 
not enter the market, such as that which is retained for self-consumption by farmers or is earned by 
labourers as in-kind payment, goes through a local chakki.  For grain that customers bring for 
grinding, the chakki charges a small fee — 2 rupees per kg in rural areas and 4 rupees in Karachi.x 
The chakki system is the predominant value chain in the wheat-growing rural areas of Punjab and 
Sindh, by which grain is crushed into whole wheat flour.’xi Chakkis are not limited to rural areas.  
They are common in cities too.  Chakkis also buy grain from the market. This is particularly the case 
in urban areas where customers do not, typically, have their own grain stores. 
 
The second method is processing through large-scale flour mills spread across the country.  These 
mills acquire grain from two sources.  Licensed mills are supplied grain from government stocks at 
subsidised prices, and they are also free to buy grain from the open market.  Nearly all of the grain 
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procured by the government eventually ends up being processed in a licensed flour mill.  Mills 
produce a range of varieties of flour, from ‘regular’ to ‘fine’ qualities.  Among consumers there is a 
strong identification of regular flour with flour made from government-supplied grain, even though 
there is no restriction on millers using grain from private suppliers to produce regular flour.  
Industry key informants were of the view that mills are responsive to consumer preferences in 
terms of colour, taste and texture and these vary across regions and socio-economic groups.  They 
believe that regular flour is regarded as an inferior product in some market segments in which there 
is a strong preference for ‘fine’ qualities. 
 
Most of the licensed flour mills are thought to be represented in the Pakistan Flour Mills Association 
(PFMA).  The PFMA website mentions a total of 915 mills operating across the country. Not all mills 
are registered with PFMA however, and different sources provide varying numbers. It has been 
noted that the reported output capacity of licensed mills in Pakistan far exceeds market 
requirements.xii  No data was found on the number of industrial-scale flour mills which are not 
licensed or are not members of PFMA. 
 
The relationship between government agencies (primarily the provincial food department) and 
privately-owned licensed flour mills currently revolves around three parameters. One, mills are 
assigned quotas according to their processing capacities and their supply of government-procured 
grain is determined by this quota.  Two, a mill is obliged to produce a requisite quantity of regular 
flour against the supply of grain.xiii  Three, the ex-mill price of regular flour, whether it is made from 
government-supplied grain or grain acquired from the market, is agreed between the government 
and the mills association.xiv  This price is set by taking into account processing costs and other 
margins which are negotiated between the millers and the government. Industry sources claim that 
while all atta is subject to the food department’s price regulation, ‘fine’ qualities are actually maida 
(all-purpose flour) which has low bran content and is therefore exempt. 
3.1.2 Seasons and regions 
There is also a seasonal element in the operation of these various value chains.xv  In the wheat-
growing areas, while the richer rural households (and some urban ones) have grain stores which last 
them the entire year, most rural households run out of their grain stocks several months before the 
new harvest.  From around January, therefore, local chakkis mostly sell flour made from the grain 
that they themselves purchase.  Some in the rural areas continue to grind grain for their customers 
but stop selling flour once their stocks run out in the late season. 
 
The formal value chain around the larger flour mills also operates seasonally.  While government 
procurement operations take place at harvest time (March to May), supplies from this stock begin 
only from around September and carry on till the next harvest.  The government intervenes in the 
market at a time when privately-held post-harvest stocks have dwindled and there is an upward 
pressure on the price of flour.  It is also reported, however, that many mills remain idle in the post-
harvest period and only start operations when grain from the government stock is released.xvi 
 
Figure 1 shows the monthly price of wheat at three reporting stations of the Pakistan Bureau of 
Statistics’ survey of markets and prices. Nawabshah (now Benazirabad) is in a wheat-growing area of 
Sindh and an important procurement centre for the government, Rawalpindi is in a wheat- deficit 
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region of Punjab with a high degree of dependence on government-supplied stocks of wheat, and the 
large metropolis of Karachi draws in supplies from the market.  Wheat prices are lower throughout 
the year in the wheat-surplus region (Nawabshah) compared with the two wheat-deficit centres 
(Rawalpindi and Karachi).   In the two regions where the government procurement and supply 
system dominates, there is a clear seasonal effect in grain prices with a significant downturn during 
the harvest season (March to May).  In Karachi, where grain supply is dominated by the private 
sector, the seasonal effect is less marked. 
 
Figure 1: Wheat Price (rupees per 100 kg) 
 
Source:  Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, issues from February 2016 to 
January 2017 
3.1.3 Prices and efficiency 
The wheat procurement and supply system has given rise to several types of inefficiencies.  The 
subsidy to producers in the shape of relatively high procurement prices is mostly captured by the 
larger farmers, even if it does serve the function of encouraging domestic wheat output and 
preventing hoarding and smuggling (Gazdar and Mallah 2013).xvii  The government ends up with a 
virtual monopoly in the stock of wheat grain in wheat-deficit areas (besides Karachi).  According to 
an FAO study (Prikhodko and Zrilyi 2013), there is little incentive for the private sector to invest in 
storage capacity if the government is expected to subsidise the cost of holding stocks.  Licensed 
private sector mills are then allocated quotas of subsidised grain from government stocks.  The 
quotas are determined by mill size, and this accounts for over-investment or over-reporting of 
milling capacity (Dorosh and Salam 2008). 
 
There are questions about the ability of government agencies to exercise effective control over the 
quantity of regular flour produced.xviii It is, indeed, surprising that neither the government nor the 
flour mills association have reliable data on the output of the mills, or the relative contribution of 
government-supplied versus privately-traded grain in industrial-scale mills.  The confusion 
surrounding the precise status of ‘fine’ flour, and whether or not it counts as atta, is another 
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example of the lack of transparency in the sector.  ‘Fine’ flour is not subject to the price regulation 
that governs atta.  Its average price in 2016 was anywhere between 7 to 47 per cent higher than the 
price of regular flour in the same market (Table1). This price differential suggests that there might 
be incentives for the mills to divert some of their allocation of subsidised grain towards maida 
production. 
 
Table1: Prices of regular and ‘fine’ flour in various cities 
 
Price (rupees per kg) of Wheat Flour Varieties  
Difference in Price (%) 
  
Regular Fine 
Karachi 42.50 48.32 14 
Nawabshah 39.39 46.09 17 
Multan 37.13 39.54 7 
Lahore 38.75 50.00 29 
Rawalpindi 38.33 56.30 47 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 
issues from February 2016 to January 2017 
 
Prikhodko and Zrilyi (2013) estimate that the issue price of wheat to flour mills includes a subsidy 
element of around 15 per cent.  In urban areas where regular mill flour sells alongside unsubsidised 
whole wheat chakki flour,  the latter was found to be 10 to 12 per cent dearer than the former.  
This is an informative comparison because it suggests that the value chain that produces chakki flour 
remains competitive despite the industrial scale and public subsidy enjoyed by the modern value 
chain. 
3.1.4 Fortifiable wheat flour 
International organisations recommend that wheat-flour fortification is appropriate in countries 
where a high proportion of the flour consumed is fortifiable — processed in industrial-scale milling 
facilities (WHO et al. 2009). xix  Previous and planned wheat- flour fortification interventions in 
Pakistan are, correspondingly, based on working with licensed formal sector flour mills. Moreover, 
fortification interventions in Pakistan seek to leverage existing public-private partnership between 
government (mostly provincial food departments) and licensed mills which are members of the 
Pakistan Flour Mills Association (PFMA).  There are no precise data in Pakistan on fortifiable flour — 
or flour which is milled using industrial roller mills. There are questions also about the number of 
licensed flour mills and their production capacities (see section 3.3.1 for a detailed discussion).   
3.2 Wheat economy of households  
3.2.1 Wheat-growing rural region 
The sample survey of households in rural Sindh provided insights into consumption patterns in 
wheat-producing areas.  Of the 939 households who reported using wheat flour roti as their main 
staple food, around two-thirds had some grain from the harvest — either from their crop, or as in-
kind payment for work done.  But only 18 per cent had sufficient grain to last them the whole year.  
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Others either bought grain to take to chakkis or bought flour.  Nearly three-fifths of the wheat-
consuming households in the sample (59 per cent) worried about not having enough food to eat.  A 
third of the households reported that adults had gone to bed hungry at least once in the previous 
month, and in 19.3 per cent of the households, even children had slept hungry. 
 
For the time that their own store of grain lasted, rural households did not purchase flour. They took 
their grain to the local chakki.  In in-depth interviews in the wheat-growing region, the issue of 
quality came up in most conversations about different sources of flour.  The experience of Raheela, 
whose family does not own land but receives grain for wages, was fairly typical: 
 
"We get compensated with wheat grain for our labour. We use one maund (a unit of weight, equal to about 
40 kg) every 5 or 6 days — we have a big family. When there is no work we end up buying ‘sarkari’ 
(government) flour from the local shop. The shop doesn’t keep chakki flour. We prefer chakki flour — we 
don't like the consistency of milled flour.  It feels like chewing gum and is sometimes white and at other times 
black, and causes stomach aches." (Raheela, age 27, Naushero Feroze District) 
 
Although mills can produce atta using either government or privately-acquired grain, most 
respondents mill flour with the government system.  Besides perceptions about quality in terms of 
freshness and adulteration, consumers in the wheat-growing area also expressed their preference 
for freshly-ground chakki flour referring to its nutritional value:  
 
“There is ‘strength’ in the real (pure) grain, not in the factory-milled flour which is mixed with other stuff.  
We prefer getting and storing grain to flour, because we get it crushed as needed. We like fresh flour.  Grain 
has its own vitamins, but loose flour is adulterated.” (Hamid, age 40, Naushero Feroze District)  
3.2.2 Urban areas 
It was surprising to find a strong preference for chakki flour in both the Karachi fieldwork sites.  In 
Azam Basti, along with factory-milled flour, a local chakki is also a main source of flour — and unlike 
communities in the wheat-growing areas, chakki flour is available all year round. 
 
“My husband brings 5 kg of wheat flour which lasts a week. We make chapati. The shop is close by. Chakki 
flour is fresh and healthier. Flour from the mills is often stale.” (Saima, age 36, Azam Basti, Karachi) 
 
Bhittaiabad, by contrast, has stronger rural linkages, as many of its residents are recent rural-urban 
migrants.  Residents bring grain from their villages to the city and use a local chakki much in the 
same way as their rural counterparts — that is, to grind their own grain.  
 
“We buy wheat from our village in Sindh and bring it over by bus. My husband or some other family member 
who visits the village brings it with them. We bring 40 to 60 kg, and grind 25 kg at a time. This lasts us a 
month. We don’t have our own land but our village has a lot of wheat, so my husband buys it at harvest 
time.  The flour made from this wheat tastes good, and its roti has a nice colour. We don’t buy milled flour. 
Our own wheat is better.” (Huma, age 25, Bhittaiabad, Karachi) 
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Like their rural counterparts, many in Bhittaiabad are unable to stock enough grain to last them the 
whole year. They need to rely on alternatives.  Some opt for milled flour because it is cheaper than 
that from the chakki.  Interviews with other informants in Karachi, including shopkeepers, confirm 
the availability of various types of flour — chakki as well as different grades of milled flour. 
 
In the city of Muzaffarabad in Azad Jammu Kashmir, there were no chakkis or chakki flour.  This 
region does not have very much wheat cultivation and relies on milled flour. It is also a region where 
a wheat flour fortification initiative is currently active, with the claim that local mills (nearly all of 
which depend on government-supplied grain) are part of the programme.  While most of the 
households that were interviewed bought industrially-milled flour, none were aware of the 
availability or benefits of fortified flour. The flour that the respondents bought was, almost without 
exception, sourced from mills located outside AJK. ‘Fine’ flour or maida is popular here and we were 
told that regular coarse flour, known in this area as ‘red flour’, is considered to be an inferior 
product and is consumed mostly by the urban poor and rural households.  
 
“We usually buy small quantities of loose flour, not large sacks which are expensive. I don’t know about 
fortified flour.  I know that there are different qualities of flour — like ‘red’ and fine. We don’t buy fine flour 
because it is more expensive. We don’t have any strong preference in terms of taste.” (Sajida, age 29, 
Muzaffarabad) 
 
Some of the reasons for the unpopularity of mill atta here are similar to those in the wheat- growing 
region.  It is suspected that red flour is made from poor quality grain and contains adulterants and 
impurities. 
3.3 Issues highlighted for wheat flour fortification interventions 
This review of the wheat flour value chain reveals a number of institutional issues that are pertinent 
to the viability and success of wheat flour fortification interventions. 
3.3.1 Data gaps 
First, there are significant gaps in the data on key aspects of the wheat economy.  While the PFMA 
website reports a total of 915 mills across the country, other sources give divergent numbers.xx  The 
mills association publishes data on the aggregate milling capacity of its members but no data are 
available on their utilisation of grain or their output of atta or maida. Gaffey et al. (2014) assert — 
without citing a source — that around half of all households acquire their flour from the mills.   A 
key informant from an INGO  involved in a fortification programme was of the view that mills 
account for around 60 per cent of all flour consumed in the country.  Other sources speculate that 
mills cater to the consumption needs of around 40 per cent of the population (Prikhodko and Zrilyi 
2013).  There is no precise data on the number of chakkis either — estimates range from 6,000 (a 
key informant from an INGO), 7,925 (a representative of the Pakistan Flour Mills Association; Awan 
2015) to 30,000 (Gaffey et al. 2014). There is also little independent information on the share of 
different flour products (for example, ‘regular’ and ‘fine’) in the output of the licensed mills. 
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3.3.2 Consumer constraints and choices 
Second, factors which determine the availability and consumption of fortifiable flour in preference to 
its alternatives vary across income groups and regions.  For many of the poorest, the most salient 
nutritional issue is the acquisition of sufficient amounts of flour or bread to stave off hunger.  But 
even families, such as that of Raheela above, who opt for the cheapest alternative available have a 
clear preference for particular types of flour.  Rural consumers in wheat-growing areas as well as 
urban migrants from those areas prefer freshly-ground chakki flour for its texture, taste and the 
perception of ‘goodness’.  In non-wheat growing areas and urban centres that have historically relied 
on milled flour (made from government-issued wheat), coarse flour is considered to be an inferior 
product and the more expensive fine flour (or maida) is associated with upward mobility. 
 
Consumer choices and options for different types of products are driven by a range of 
considerations including tastes, perceptions about quality and nutritional value, price and availability, 
including seasonal availability.  Consumers who have been exposed to milled flour for some time, 
either due to the non-availability of chakki flour or because of a price difference, incline towards that 
product.  Others, particularly those with strong rural linkages, but not only those, prefer chakki 
flour. 
 
The discussion of consumer choice and behaviour needs to be foregrounded in the scale of the 
undernutrition problem in Pakistan.  While wheat flour might be a potential vehicle for introducing 
micronutrients, its primary role in the food economy of the poorest is still as a source of energy.  
Despite self-sufficiency in wheat production and the existence of a large government system for 
procuring, storing and issuing wheat, hunger continues to affect large segments of the population.  
This calls for a critical examination of the wheat flour value chain not only from the point of view of 
fortification but from a broader hunger and food security perspective. 
3.3.3 Regulatory weaknesses 
The observations above point to regulatory weaknesses in the wheat economy, particularly in the 
relationship between government and mills.  The absence of precise data on key aspects of the value 
chain underlines the lack of transparency in the utilisation of the public subsidy.  Negative consumer 
perceptions about mill atta point to inadequate incentives and sanctions to ensure quality.  The 
system has introduced costly distortions, and is unable to pass on the benefit of subsidies and 
industrial scale to consumers.  Wheat fortification interventions seek to leverage existing public-
private partnerships in a segment of the wheat flour value chain which is beset with regulatory 
lapses. 
 
4. Fortification programmes 
4.1 Fieldwork findings in Azad Jammu and Kashmir 
There are 11 licensed flour mills in AJK, and apart from two mills in Mirpur which have special 
permission to buy some grain privately from Punjab province, all of them rely exclusively on 
government-supplied grain.  The mills are NI partners and, as such, have agreed to produce only 
fortified flour.xxi Fortified flour is available only with licensed depots.  Other shops do not stock it.  
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Most of the stores that were visited, however, stocked flour from mills located in Punjab or 
elsewhere. There was only one licensed depot across Muzaffarabad and fortified flour was not found 
in any other retail outlet.  Some shops stocked a local brand which had the tagline ‘full of nutrition’ 
on the packaging, but there was no specific mention of fortification on the bag.xxii According to 
millers and wholesalers, the rural poor end up buying the fortified flour not because they know it is 
fortified but because they are constrained to buy the cheaper ‘red’ flour which happens to be 
fortified.xxiii Most of the private storekeepers who were interviewed had no idea about fortification, 
but recalled that after the earthquake in 2005 they received WFP-supplied flour in packaging which 
indicated that the flour contained iron. 
 
At the one licensed depot that was found, the shopkeeper said he had little incentive to sell or keep 
fortified flour as it had a very small margin for him.  He said that a 40 kg bag of flour — whether it 
was fortified or not — sold for 1,500 rupees.  He bought fortified flour for 1,486 rupees, but could 
get non-fortified flour (from Punjab mills) for 1,360 rupees. The shopkeeper was of the opinion that 
the fortified flour was considered inferior by most urban consumers because of its darker colour. 
The licensed shopkeeper said that he received an advertising banner about fortified wheat when he 
first started stocking it, indicating its availability at his shop.  That banner was damaged and had not 
been replaced.  Consumers, including those living close to the licensed depot, were unaware of any 
fortification initiative. 
4.2 Current fortification plans 
A new national level plan for wheat flour fortification was initiated in 2016 with a grant from UKaid.  
This project is to be implemented by a consortium of organisations (including NI) in partnership with 
provincial and federal governments.  The wheat flour fortification element of this project is similar in 
some ways to past initiatives.  The project aims to work with licensed flour mills and PFMA to 
provide feeders, premix and training for flour fortification.  The project is based on the premise that 
a high proportion of the wheat flour consumed in Pakistan is fortifiable but project documents are 
unable to specify the relative sizes of the mills and chakki value chains. 
 
The main lesson from past projects which is reflected in the initial thinking about programme design 
is the need for prior attention to mandatory fortification in the provinces, and the setting up of 
quality checking and enforcement mechanisms on the ground.xxiv Project design is premised on the 
view that when mills are properly equipped and their staff trained, the marginal cost of fortification 
will be relatively small.  It is anticipated that the programme will be commercially viable once 
consumer demand and government regulations are established, as consumers will be willing to pay 
the small increment in cost due to fortification.xxv  The reported success of mandatory salt iodisation 
in Pakistan figures prominently as a model in this regard.xxvi 
 
5. Discussion 
Technocratic optimism around the reduction in anaemia through wheat flour fortification is based on 
a number of assumptions about consumer behaviour, producer incentives and regulatory action that 
appear to be unrealistic.  There are questions about whether, or to what extent, the simple checklist 
of pro-nutrition value chain actions and processes identified by Maestre et al. (2017) are met by the 
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generic design of flour fortification programmes that has shown resilience in Pakistan. A number of 
salient findings are apparent that can be helpful in drawing lessons for flour fortification going 
forward.   
 
First, unlike wheat-producing regions of Pakistan, AJK does not have any significant number of 
chakkis.  A high proportion of flour that is consumed in this region, therefore, is produced in 
industrial-scale mills and thus fortifiable.  There is a high acceptance of milled flour and no strong 
preference in favour of chakki flour in AJK.  This might be due to the fact that being a wheat-deficit 
area, consumers in this region have been exposed to milled wheat for a long period of time. 
 
Second, within milled flour there were clear patterns and preferences.  Consumers and key 
informants such as retailers were of the view that ‘fine’ flour is considered desirable and is 
associated with upward socio-economic mobility.  By contrast, rural and poorer urban consumers 
buy ‘red flour’.  One of the factors driving the preference for more processed flour is similar to the 
reason behind the popularity of (the less processed) chakki flour in other areas.  There is a 
perception that mills use low quality grain, and flour is adulterated with impurities which add bulk.  
The finer texture and lighter colour of refined flour is associated with the absence not just of bran, 
but of other impurities too.  This issue of flour grading is important because millers believe that they 
are mandated to fortify only the ‘red flour’.  Locally-produced fine qualities are not fortified. 
 
Third, the impact of the demand-creation campaign for the fortified product was not visible.  Besides 
not being easily available, fortified flour was not seen as a distinct commodity with particular 
nutritional benefits.  This can be a drawback if there are issues in the acceptance of flour with 
different visible attributes like colour and texture.  The lack of demand for the fortified product 
creates incentives for millers, wholesalers and retailers to produce and stock non-fortified flour. 
 
It might be argued that constraints to the successful implementation of the Micro-nutrient Initiative 
(MI)   project — now known as NI — in AJK were partly related to the nature of the region itself.  
While the high level of reliance of AJK mills on government-supplied wheat from outside the region 
made AJK a good candidate for fortification, the fact that flour could be brought in easily from other 
non-fortification regions, such as Punjab, also made the uptake of fortified flour more challenging.  It 
is possible that, like the GAIN-led project, the main obstacle to successful implementation lay with 
regulation and its effective enforcement.  Questions remain, nevertheless, about the compatibility of 
private sector incentives and the acceptability of fortifiable flour. 
 
Implications of the existence of alternative value chains from farm to consumer need to be 
understood better.  There is lack of clarity about the prevalence of fortifiable flour.  Not only is 
there ambiguity about the volume of flour produced by chakkis, there are questions about the 
number, capacity and operation of industrial mills.  The qualitative research on the producer- and 
the consumer-end of the value chain shows that there are seasonal and regional dimensions to the 
prevalence of fortifiable flour. The availability of fortified flour to the target population is not simply 
an unresolved issue with respect to the relative size of the chakki value chain which is not subject to 
any of the fortification programmes.  There are seasonal variations in the operation of industrial mills 
too across different parts of the country.  Existing evidence on the acceptability of fortified flour 
(e.g., Mahmood et al. 2007) is based on the blind testing of specially-prepared batches of flour which 
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are identical except for the addition of fortificants.  A more realistic comparison will include the 
range of products of different qualities that are actually available to consumers across seasons and 
locations. The impact of wheat flour fortification on outcomes such as growth and anaemia has been 
difficult to establish empirically even under conditions where there is high and consistent exposure 
to fortified flour (Hurrel et al. 2010).  It is likely to be considerably harder to show in a population 
where a large segment does not consume fortified flour on a consistent basis.  The prevalence of 
alternative value chains is likely to be a function of a combination of factors including incentives along 
the value chain and consumer preferences. 
 
Project design is based on the premise that consumer behaviour can be made to change to suit the 
requirements of fortification.  It is posited that there are no major constraints to the acceptance of 
fortified flour — none that social marketing cannot overcome.  This is a key assumption which 
remains to be tested.  The experience of the AJK project is not helpful in this regard because of the 
poor implementation of the consumer awareness campaign. This qualitative study on consumer 
attitudes suggests that there are reasons, some of them based on nutritional or food safety grounds, 
for the popularity of chakki over milled flour in some communities, and for ‘fine’ varieties of milled 
flour over the regular atta in others.  But chakki flour is likely to remain outside the remit of a 
standard fortification intervention that focuses on industrial mills, and it is unclear if the ‘fine’ variety 
will be brought under mandatory regulation given its current regulatory exemption. 
 
There is a question about whether, or to what extent, the measures incorporated in the design of 
the proposed project, such as partnering with the industry association, mandatory regulation, 
creating capacity for testing and quality control, and demand creation, can help to overcome 
bottlenecks in the wheat flour fortification value chain.  The success of salt iodisation has been cited 
as a model for wheat flour fortification.xxvii  MI worked with private- sector salt processors, 
particularly the larger ones, provided equipment and training, subsidised the fortificant, and helped to 
set up mechanisms for testing and quality control.xxviii  It encouraged the formation of a Salt 
Processors’ Association in order to facilitate liaison with the producers.  In the absence of national 
and provincial legislation, the programme relied on district-level enforcement of existing food quality 
rules to monitor the output of salt. There was also a consumer information component of the 
programme which mobilised various opinion-leaders and LHW (lady health workers).  Some 
elements of the programme are comparable with the proposed wheat flour fortification project. 
 
There are caveats, however, which need to be considered if lessons of the salt iodisation programme 
are to be applied to the wheat flour value chain.  First, a large proportion of the population was 
already aware of the importance of consuming iodised salt several years prior to the MI initiative 
which began in 2005 (NNS 2011).  Second, the technology for testing iodisation is relatively simple 
and portable, compared with wheat flour which requires laboratory testing.  Third, unlike in the case 
of wheat flour, there do not appear to be multiple value chains driven by producer incentives and 
consumer preferences.  Cooking salt is a relatively undifferentiated product for most consumers.  
Finally, salt iodisation was found to have been effective even though an independent review found it 
to have fallen short of prescribed standards in a number of regulatory areas (Masuood and Janjua 
2013).   
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It is doubtful if a sub-optimally implemented wheat flour fortification programme could be expected 
to demonstrate comparable impact, since there are critical issues with respect to producer 
incentives and regulation. The AJK fieldwork reiterated regulatory weaknesses in the government-
mills relationship as, perhaps, a basic institutional constraint which has ramifications not only for the 
quantity and outreach of fortifiable flour, but also on consumer perceptions about its quality. 
Mandatory fortification backed up by effective quality checking has been proposed as a solution to 
such problems (Gaffey et al. 2014). It is questionable, however, if a technical response is sufficient to 
turn things around in an entire segment of the industry that has evolved around the capture not of 
entrepreneurial rent (as envisaged in the value-chain perspective) but of public subsidy. 
 
6. Conclusion 
A value-chain perspective on the agri-food systems linking wheat production to consumption in 
Pakistan yields important insights for nutrition programming.  Wheat is perhaps the most important 
food crop in the country, and being the main source of energy for large segments of the population, 
it occupies a central place in food security and nutrition policies.  The government has a strategic 
position in the wheat flour value chain even though private sector stakeholders are responsible for 
virtually all of the wheat grown and processed in the country.  The government’s role in the 
procurement, storage and transportation of wheat makes it the leading market player that influences 
price, availability, and investments in the sector.  Although the government also enjoys administrative 
and regulatory authority, its strategic position is largely due to the volume of its market intervention. 
The persistence of felt as well as hidden hunger suggests that the existing system has failed to ensure 
food security for the population, even if it does prevent shortages and price spirals in urban markets. 
The system has, however, spawned inefficiencies, regulatory failures and rent-capture.  Nutrition 
interventions such as wheat flour fortification need to be part of a broader reform agenda that has 
food security at its central objective.  
 
The effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the modern wheat flour value chain, which is 
dominated by government operations, has been called into question on a number of counts.  
Although the wheat procurement policy has been successful in ensuring national self-sufficiency of an 
essential food, it has not led to food security at the household or individual levels.  There are 
concerns of adverse incentives with respect to milling capacity (or its reporting), and private sector 
investment in storage and transportation.  The traditional value chain which supplies stone-ground 
whole wheat flour from smaller chakkis remains competitive, despite not being a recipient of 
government subsidies.  A broader reform agenda that has food security at its central objective can 
lead to a politically- and fiscally-sustainable wheat value chain. 
 
The consumer end of the wheat value chain sustains diverse types and grades of flour.  Tastes, 
preferences, perceptions of quality and nutritional value, price and availability, are all factors that lead 
to the persistence of these diverse products.  Given the importance of the wheat sector for food 
security, the absence of more precise data and analysis of the consumer end of the value chain is 
surprising.  Pro-nutrition interventions in the wheat flour value chain will need a better 
understanding of consumer choices and constraints.  Value- chain interventions that lead to or 
require changes in consumer behaviour need to be approached with caution, particularly if the 
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sustainability of the intervention is premised on government action in areas where implementation 
capacity and governance systems have found to be wanting. 
 
Given the depth of the nutrition deficit in Pakistan, the delivery of essential nutrients through the 
fortification of a widely-consumed staple food will remain an attractive proposition.  The scientific 
and technical aspects of intervention design need to be seen alongside a range of factors which shape 
consumer behaviour and producer incentives.   Fortification interventions that are not attentive to 
institutional constraints that perpetuate inefficiencies along the value chain are not likely to deliver 
on their potential.  Will engagement with these arrangements lead to an unwitting endorsement of 
regulatory weakness and rent-seeking opportunity, or can it be used as a lever for much needed 
reform? 
 
Wheat flour fortification and other food fortification initiatives across the globe are sustained, in 
part, by technocratic optimism which needs to be corrected using other evaluative frameworks such 
as those offered by the value-chain perspective.  The possibility of the involvement of the business 
sector through public-private partnerships tends to magnify this optimism by holding out the 
prospect of commercial viability and long-term sustainability.  The core narrative is appealing, indeed, 
as it combines the apparent certainty of science with the logic of the market.  This case study of 
wheat flour fortification interventions in Pakistan is a cautionary tale that highlights some costs of 
ignoring process for output.  It calls for taking a step back and asking if existing public-private 
partnerships in the sector where the intervention is sought are ready for institutional reform.  
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Notes 
  
                                               
 
i Technocratic optimism has been shown to affect expert opinion and decision-making in a number 
of spheres (e.g. Clark et al 2016), and is thought to be stronger among specialised experts in a given 
field compared with individuals with broader areas of expertise (Tichy 2004). 
ii In fact, as Bishai and Nalubola (2002) show, following the success of salt iodization in eliminating 
goitre in US mid-west in the 1920s, the championing of other forms of food fortification (notably 
that of wheat flour and bread with iron) was based on technocratic optimism rather than specific 
evidence of impact. 
iii Evidence of positive impact of flour fortification programmes is, understandably, even more 
ambivalent than that based on trials (Hurrell et al 2010; Pachon et al 2015). 
iv A brief account of how the value-chain perspective evolved with respect to nutrition is offered in 
Ansari et al (2018) 
v See, for example, Coles and Mitchell (2011), Devaux et al (2016), Gelli et al (2015), Harper et al 
(2015), Hawkes (2009), and Poole (2013). 
vi The Women’s Work and Nutrition survey undertaken for LANSA (Leveraging Agriculture and 
Nutrition in South Asia) in collaboration between the Collective for Social Science Research and the 
Leverhulme Center for Integrative Research on Agriculture included modules related to the 
consumption end of wheat flour. 
vii The government agencies responsible for procuring wheat are the provincial food departments 
who operate in their respective provinces, and the federal government’s Pakistan Agricultural 
Storage and Supplies Corporation (PASSCO) which mostly conducts its operations in Punjab 
(Dorosh and Salam 2008; Prikhodko and Zryili 2013). 
viii Administrative measures such as prohibitions on the inter-district and inter-provincial movement 
of grain are also put in place at particular times to prevent hoarding and cross-border trade. 
ix These aggregate harvest shares are based on Dorosh and Salam (2008), who in turn, base their 
estimates on a survey of farmers in Punjab and Sindh in the late 1990s. 
x Authors’ fieldwork. 
xi Key informant interview, sector expert, Islamabad. 
xii The PFMA website reports an installed capacity of 77,000 mt per day. If the mills operated for 300 
days in a year they would process the entire annual wheat harvest of 23 million mt.  
xiii According an industry key informant, subsidised flour is sold only in 20 kg sacks while other flour 
can be sold in packets of various sizes. Furthermore, in some regions such as AJK, government-
milled flour can be sold only through licensed dealers. 
xiv While the ex-mill price is regulated by the provincial food department, wholesale and retail price 
regulation comes within the domain of other market regulation authorities in most areas. 
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xv Authors’ fieldwork. 
xvi Key informants from milling industry; Dorosh and Salam (2008) 
xvii Government procurement agencies only buy wheat which is delivered to them in officially-
supplied gunny sacks (bardana).  Large producers who have political connections or are able to pay 
bribes corner the supply of bardana, hence ensuring that their harvest is bought at the higher prices 
paid by procurement agencies. 
xviii Our inferences from field observations support previous sector analysis such as Dorosh and 
Salam (2008). 
xix Designating industrially milled flour as ‘fortifiable’ is to do with the available fortification 
technologies rather than the milling process itself. 
xx Some of our key informants thought that there were 1,200 to 1,300 mills. Gaffey et al (2014) 
record 1,200 mills, and the logframe of DFID’s (United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development, also UKAid) food fortification project in Pakistan (DFID 2016a) notes a total of 1202 
licensed mills. A 2015 presentation by an expert associated with PFMA claims that there were 1,575 
mills registered with the association (Awan 2015). 
xxi According to the programme director, the choice of AJK for the MI fortification project was partly 
motivated by the fact that the region has a high proportion of fortifiable wheat, and that there is 
greater government control over the supply of grain (Naqash 2015). 
xxii It was surprising, given the claim that all local mills relied exclusively on government-supplied 
grain, that this AJK mill produced flour other than the regular fortified variety. 
xxiii In the rural localities close to Muzaffarabad that were visited, retailers did not report stocking 
fortified ‘red’ flour.  It was not possible to visit more remote rural areas due to security-related 
travel restrictions. 
xxiv Gaffey et al (2014) draw this lesson from the unpublished evaluation of an earlier national wheat 
flour fortification project. 
xxv The consumer demand component of the proposed project appears similar to the design of 
previous projects with reliance on social marketing campaigns and messaging through Lady Health 
Workers (LHWs) at the community level. 
xxvi See, for example, the scoping study for this project (Gaffey et al 2014). 
xxvii The two rounds of the National Nutrition Survey — 2001 and 2011 — indicated a decline in 
severe iodine deficiency among children, from 23 per cent to 2 per cent.  While a salt iodisation 
programme had been in place since 1994, Masuood and Janjua (2013) argue that the decline in iodine 
deficiency was due to an MI-supported ‘revitalisation’ of this programme in 2005. 
xxviii Masuood and Janjua (2013) provide a detailed account of this programme. 
 
